Agawu, Kofi. 2003.“The Ethics of Observation.” Representing African Music. New York: Routledge.
In the chapter “The Ethics of Observation” from his book Representing African Music, Kofi Agawu observes that there has been little discussion about ethics in the field of ethnomusicology. Instead of trying to construct his own model of what is ethical in ethnographic research, Agawu’s writing initiates this conversation about ethics by posing questions about the ethics of his own and his colleagues research, most of which he leaves unanswered.
In addressing his own fieldwork experience, for example, Agawu cites one event in which he lied to an African chief in order the protect the safety of an individual in his research team (212) and then poses the ethical question “is there virtue in deception?” (213). In addressing his colleague Kisliuk’s research, Agawu explores the ethics of protecting a culture from globalization, if that culture welcomes it (217). In addition to posing more questions about his own and Kisliuk’s very reflexive research, he also lists other ethical dilemmas, such as the ethics of studying inappropriately obtained field recordings or writing about secret ceremonies (204).
Agawu’s primary purpose for presenting these and other ethical dilemmas is to show the lack of formal discussion about ethics in ethnomusicology writing. What bothers me about Aqawu’s writing is that he never answers any of his own general questions or attempts to formulate how to answer these questions. Aqawu eventually proposes his own stance on ethics in ethnomusicology stating that ethnomusicologists should adopt an “ethical attitude” (220) while doing fieldwork. However, he then says that this attitude “cannot be defined in terms of praxis, as a set of prescriptions for social action” (220) and that “concrete prescriptions risk betraying their own thorough imbrications in the intricacies of local context” (220). If Aqawu is saying that ethical practices are closely tied to their specific contexts, then how can there be an organized, intelligent discussion about ethics in something as large and general as a whole field of humanities? How is he then justified in being critical of this lack of discussion?
The ethical dilemmas Aqawu poses and does answer deal exclusively with specific situations. If Aqawu is actually trying to be critical about the lack of ethnomusicologists’ reflexivity and discussion of ethics in the specifics of their own work, then he should clarify this.
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